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The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has brought renewed attention to the
conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We model both the CRA conflict of understating
credit risk to attract more business, and the issuer conflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings
(issuer shopping), and examine the effectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs.
We find that CRAs are more prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors
in the market who take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To
the extent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk for CRAs
of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs are more likely to
understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due to issuer shopping, competition
among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on the same equilibrium CRA rating policy)
than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both total ex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing
tranching decreases total surplus further. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments
for rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure
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￿[The investment] could be structured by cows and we would rate it￿
- Analyst at one of the main credit rating agencies in an email referring to structured
￿nance products, April 5, 20071
The analyst in the above statement refers to the key problem for credit rating agencies:
how should the agencies act when their principal revenue stream comes from the ￿rms whose
products are getting rated? This question has been brought to the public￿ s [and regulators￿ ]
attention many times, such as during the East Asian Financial Crisis (1997) and the failures
of Enron (2001) and Worldcom (2002), but it has never been so salient as in the current
subprime crisis. The dollar value of originations of subprime mortgages rose from $65 billion
in 19952 to approximately $600 billion in 20063, and Moody￿ s pro￿ts tripled between 2002
and 20064. In this paper, we examine the con￿ icts of interests that credit ratings agencies
(CRAs) face and the pros and cons of several proposals to regulate the industry.
The key elements of our model include:
￿ Issuers￿payments may in￿uence ratings: While CRAs have, in principle, list price
schedules, they may renegotiate fees with regular customers (White (2002)).5,6 The
SEC found that senior analytical managers and supervisors participated in fee discus-
sions with issuers7 and the analytical sta⁄also discussed ratings decisions and method-
ology in the context of fees and market share. For instance, a senior analytical manager
1United States Securities and Exchange Commission (2008), p.12.
2Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006), p. 37.
3Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008).
4"Triple-A-Failure," by Roger Lowenstein, New York Times Magazine, April 27, 2008. Moody￿ s pro￿ts
are the easiest of the CRAs to measure since they are a public stand-alone company. "Moody￿ s operating
margins exceeded 50 percent for the past six years, three to four times those of Exxon Mobil Corp., the
world￿ s biggest oil company.""Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge," by
Elliot Blair Smith, www.bloomberg.com, Sept 24, 2008.
5The SEC found that in a sample of subprime RMBS deals, 12 arrangers represented 80% of the business
in both number and dollar volume, while for CDOs of subprime deals, 11 arrangers accounted for 92% of
the deals and 80% of the dollar volume. (SEC (2008) p.32).
6The CFA institute, which represents 96,000 investors, brokers, analysts, and other ￿nance professionals
found in a survey of its members "that 11% of the 1,940 respondents globally said they had ￿ witnessed￿a
ratings ￿rm ￿ change a rating as a consequence of pressure andor in￿ uence￿from an outside party such as
a bond underwriter." "Finance Group Questions Bond-Rating Proposals" by Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street
Journal, July 7, 2008.
7SEC (2008) p.24.
1wrote, ￿the CDO team didn￿ t agree with you because they believed it would negatively
impact business￿ .8 In addition, CRAs o⁄er related consulting services, such as pre-
rating assessments (of what a rating might be).
￿ Issuers shop for ratings: ￿Typically the rating agency is paid only if the credit rating
is issued￿ 9. If an issuer is unhappy with a rating, it may solicit another one. ￿Brian
Clarkson, then the president and chief operating o¢ cer of Moody￿ s Investor￿ s Service
acknowledged that, ￿ There is a lot of rating shopping that goes on...What the market
doesn￿ t know is who￿ s seen certain transactions but wasn￿ t hired to rate those deals.￿ 10
￿ CRAs￿models may vary in precision: Deven Sharma, president of S&P, said, ￿Events
have demonstrated that the historical data we used and the assumptions we made
signi￿cantly underestimated the severity of what has actually occurred￿ .11 Other errors
in the models CRAs use have been detected as well.12 Moreover, there is no requirement
that CRAs verify or perform due diligence with respect to the underlying loans for
RMBS. A rating agency ￿conducted an internal review of 45 loan ￿les and reported
that it found the appearance of fraud or misrepresentations in almost every ￿le￿ .13
￿ There are large barriers to entry in the credit rating industry: The SEC created the
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) category in 1975, to
designate credit ratings agencies whose ratings were recognized as being valuable for
investment decisions. Although 7 ￿rms initially had this designation, mergers brought
this down to 3 (Standard & Poor, Moody￿ s, and Fitch) while the SEC refused to admit
8SEC (2008), p.26.
9SEC (2008), p.9.
10"Bond-Rating Shifts Loom in Settlement; N.Y.￿ s Cuomo Plans Overhaul of How Firms Get Paid", Aaron
Lucchetti, Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2008. The article also states that "last month, Mr Clarkson, who
once ran the Moody￿ s group overseeing mortgages and other structured ￿nance products, stepped down,
e⁄ectively in July."
11"Testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Rep-
resentatives", Deven Sharma, October 22, 2008.
12"...an internal investigation by law ￿rm Sullivan & Cromwell LLP...focused on an error in Moody￿ s
models that a⁄ected 11 debt products known as constant-proportion debt obligation, or CPDOs. After
the error was detected, Moody￿ s found through model testing that correcting the error would have lowered
triple-A ratings given to the 11 CPDOs to double-A territory....Moody￿ s around that time was also changing
its methodology for how to rate CPDOs. The company said it didn￿ t make changes to the methodology
￿ to mask any model error￿ . But the law ￿rm￿ s review found that Moody￿ s analysts ￿ considered factors
inappropriate to the ratings process when reviewing CPDO ratings￿ ". WSJ "Moody￿ s Loses a Key Player..."
July 2, 2008. In another (in)famous situation, a ratings agency "issued ratings...on a model that contained
an error...nonetheless, the committee agreed to continue to maintain the ratings for several months, until
the securities were downgraded for other reasons." SEC (2008), p.26.
13SEC (2008) p. 17.
2new ￿rms.14 Since Congress, local governments, and regulatory agencies adopted this
designation, this created an ￿absolute barrier to entry￿ .15 High pro￿t margins (as
noted above) are also emblematic of a highly concentrated industry.
￿ Reputation plays a role in decisionmaking: Short term gains from in￿ ating an invest-
ment￿ s quality can be smaller than long term losses from jaded investors. A report by
Standard & Poor￿ s to the SEC in 2002 states that ￿the ongoing value of Standard &
Poor￿ s credit ratings business is wholly dependent on continued market con￿dence in
the credibility and reliability of its credit ratings￿ . 16
In this paper, we incorporate the above elements in a simple model of the ratings process.
We look at di⁄erent market structures (monopoly and duopoly) in the credit ratings market
where CRAs obtain noisy information about the quality of the investment and can provide
reports communicating that information. Issuers can purchase a report and have it issued
or shop around by having certain reports not disclosed to investors. Investors may be either
naive, in which case they take reports at face value, or sophisticated, in which case they
understand the structure of the game and can ￿gure out the CRAs￿incentives. The informa-
tion reported is nonveri￿able, but CRAs may su⁄er reputations costs (such as loss of future
business) for misselling.
We ￿nd that CRAs may in￿ ate the quality of the issuer￿ s investment when there are
more naive investors or CRA expected reputation costs are lower. This suggests that in
boom times when more investors are naive (or when more investors have lower incentive to
perform due diligence) ratings in￿ ation is more likely to occur. More precise information
increases current payo⁄s to in￿ ating, but also increases the probability of getting caught.
In an intriguing result, we ￿nd that, due to issuer shopping, duopoly can be less e¢ cient
than monopoly in terms of both total ex-ante surplus and investor surplus. A duopoly may
provide more information, but it also gives the issuer more opportunities to take advantage of
naive investors through shopping. Allowing issuers to restructure their products can decrease
surplus further.
We analyze three regulatory interventions in the credit ratings industry in the context
14Until 2006, when the SEC gave 7 new NRSROs designations. ￿The Ratings Racket￿ , The Wall Street
Journal, June 25, 2008.
15White (2002)
16Standard & Poor￿ s Ratings Service, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Public Hearing -
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Figure 1: From Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009)
of our model. First, regulation might require that the issuers pay CRAs upfront for their
rating and not contingent on the report (as envisaged under an agreement between New
York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and the three main CRAs). In our model,
this intervention implements truthtelling and increases surplus, but it doesn￿ t maximize
total surplus. A second intervention could be to require upfront fees and ban shopping by
issuers. This would prevent issuers in our model from taking advantage of naive investors,
and maximize total surplus. A third intervention could be to require investors to pay for
ratings. This could give be more costly in terms of government supervision. One weakness,
however, with the three interventions is that they may exacerbate CRA moral hazard and
undermine CRA incentives to invest in information and due diligence.
The subprime market has unique potential for exacerbating con￿ icts of interest. Figure
1 depicts the number of ratings subprime deals received. While many are rated by all three
agencies (S&P, Moody￿ s and Fitch), an important fraction are rated by only two raters. This
fraction increased substantially for subprime deals after 2005. And while two ratings in the
corporate bond market would always come from S&P and Moody￿ s, in the subprime market
they could come from any of the three. So while the ￿gure alone is not conclusive evidence
of shopping behavior, it indicates that it was a possibility. At the same time, the ability
to restructure deals meant that repackaging and renaming deals might be an issue whether
the issuer stays with the same credit rating agency or shops. Lastly, consulting over how
4to structure deals and what their ratings will be has meant more income and closer ties to
issuers for CRAs.17
There is by now a substantial literature on information intermediaries in both microeco-
nomics and ￿nance. In the microeconomics literature, information intermediaries generally
engage in acquiring and certifying information by committing to disclosure rules, as for ex-
ample in Biglaiser (1993) and Lizzeri (1999). In contrast, credit rating agencies don￿ t commit
to information disclosure rules and their incentives come from the possible reputation costs
they incur when they provide inaccurate information. This is akin to the issues ￿nancial
analysts face when they recommend stocks, as analyzed by Benabou and Laroque (1992) and
by Morgan and Stocken (2003). The model of Morgan and Stocken (2003) also addresses the
issue of unveri￿able information provision, when the certi￿er can lie but thereby incurs a ly-
ing cost (this problem is examined further in Kartik, 2008, Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani,
2007, and Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2006).
Although our signaling game is simpler in some respects, we extend the analysis relative
to this literature by examine how strategic contracting between the informed party (the
CRA) and an interested party (the issuer in our case) can a⁄ect information revelation. Our
problem is also related in this respect to the economics literature on strategic contracting
when the information revealed a⁄ects a third party, which covers a wide number of microeco-
nomic issues (see Inderst and Ottaviani, 2008, Durbin and Iyer, 2008, and Mariano, 2008).
In Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) we analyze a situation of strategic contracting where
the informed parties (banks) are setting prices for their products at the same time as pro-
viding recommendations about them to uninformed investors. In Pagano and Volpin (2008)
CRAs have no con￿ icts of interest, but can choose to be more or less opaque depending on
what the issuer asks for. They show that opaqueness can enhance liquidity in the primary
market but may cause a market freeze in the secondary market.
Several recent papers study the implications of shopping for good ratings. First, Faure-
Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2006) look at corporate governance ratings in a market
with truthful CRAs and rational investors. They show that issuers may prefer to suppress
their ratings if they are too noisy. They also ￿nd that competition between rating agencies
can result in less information disclosure. Second, Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole (2008) assume
that information intermediaries (such as ratings agencies) provide di⁄erent types of veri￿able
17This CRA consulting activity is problematic for another reason. It is akin to a teacher providing exam
questions ahead of the exam and explaining how to answer them to get a good grade. This is obviously not
a good way of testing students￿ability and level of learning.
5information and study how market structure a⁄ects shopping behavior by agents (issuers)
who are being rated. Third, Skreta and Veldkamp (2008) also assume that CRAs truthfully
relay their information and demonstrate how noisier information creates more opportunity
for shopping by issuers to take advantage of a naive clientele.
The ￿nance approach to the role of credit rating agencies has mainly focused on the
e⁄ect of announcements on the pricing of both bonds and stocks. The main ￿nding is
the asymmetry between downgrades and upgrades: downgrades have a signi￿cant negative
impact on price, but there is virtually no price change following an upgrade. The e⁄ect
of ratings changes on price is complex as the impact of ratings changes is di⁄erent for
￿rms with low ratings than for ￿rms with high ratings. Overall, there is a clear consensus
that information provided by CRAs have an e⁄ect on price (see Hand, Holthausen and
Leftwich, 1992, Hite and Warga, 1997, Berger, Davies and Flannery, 2000, Dichev and
Piotroski, 2001, and Jorion and Zhang, 2007) These ￿ndings suggest a role for CRAs in the
allocation of capital process. Yet, these results do not rule out the possibility of self-serving
ratings in￿ ation, as a CRA can decrease the probability with which it truthfully reveals
some information, and this information may still have a price impact when it is revealed.
An alternative view is that CRAs in￿ ate ratings in good times and truthfully rate in bad
times so that, on average, the information is still relevant for the market. The paper closest
to ours is Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2008), who examine the incentives of a CRA to
in￿ ate ratings in a model of endogenous reputation.18 They ￿nd that reputation cycles may
exist where a CRA builds up its reputation by relaying information accurately only to take
advantage of this reputation to later in￿ ate ratings.
A recent empirical study of CRA ratings by Becker and Milbourn (2008) provides empir-
ical support for our ￿ndings. They ￿nd that increased competition from Fitch￿ s increased
market share in the corporate bond market led to more issuer-friendly ratings and also
less informative ratings, which matches the predictions of our model. In a related study,
Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009) examine subprime and Alt-A mortgage
backed securities during the period leading up to the subprime crisis and ￿nd evidence that
several proxies for incentive problems are correlated with CRA ratings, but that there is no
overall systematic decline in rating standards.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we write down the model and solve the
18Strausz (2005) also models endogenous reputation for information intermediaries. He provides interesting
insights in line with our ￿ndings, as he argues that honest certi￿cation has some of the characteristics of a
natural monopoly.
6case for a single CRA. In Section 3, we analyze the case of competition between two CRAs.
Section 4 compares welfare in the two market structures in terms of total ex-ante surplus and
investor surplus. Section 5 investigates di⁄erent plans to regulate the credit rating industry
and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In the simplest version of the model, we consider three types of agents: an issuer, a monopoly
credit ratings agency (CRA), and a mass 1 of investors. There are multiple periods in which
funds are sought for an independent investment each period, although we will primarily
analyze the ￿rst period.
An investment is characterized by its probability of default. A bad investment defaults
with probability p > 0, and a good investment defaults with probability zero. They both
yield the same return R when not in default, and the recovery amount r conditional on
default. The investment has constant returns to scale, so that each unit issued has the same
return pro￿le.
All agents believe ex-ante that the investment is good with probability 1
2. This creates a
role for the CRA, which can use its technology to ￿nd out whether the investment is good
or bad. A signal ￿ 2 fg;bg is the private information of the CRA and has the following
informational content about the true state of the world !:
Pr(￿ = g j ! = g) = Pr(￿ = b j ! = b) = e
Pr(￿ = g j ! = b) = Pr(￿ = b j ! = g) = 1 ￿ e
The term e measures the quality of the signal received, which we will refer to as the
precision of the signal.19 At e = 1
2 the signal has revealed no information and agents retain
their ex-ante beliefs. For e > 1
2, the signal becomes informative. We assume that the level
of precision is known and in the interval (1
2;1).
Given a level of precision, the CRA posts two fees before the signal is retrieved. The
initial fee ￿
I must be paid by an issuer before the CRA does the work of retrieving the
signal, and the ratings fee ￿
R is paid for the rating to be issued. The initial fee may be
19No confusion with the statistical use of the term is possible in this context.
7thought of as a fee for hiring the CRA to perform the analysis, or alternatively for doing a
pre-assessment of the investment. The ratings fee may be thought of as the fee to have the
rating publicly reported, and could also include revenues from consulting business with the
issuer. The rating will be a message or report of m = G (￿Good￿ ) or m = B (￿Bad￿ ) that
will be observable to investors.
The CRA then retrieves the signal and makes a report. After observing the report, the
issuer can pay ￿
R to have it distributed, or refuse to purchase it. Thus we allow the issuer to
￿shop￿for ratings. This is meant to capture the back and forth negotiations that often go on
when CRAs make their ratings reports.20 If the issuer shops and refuses to buy the CRA￿ s
report, that in itself may be a signal. We assume that in this case, naive investors retain
their ex-ante beliefs but sophisticated investors update their beliefs in a way consistent with
the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Once the rating is announced, or if it is not announced due to the issuer￿ s refusal to
purchase it, the issuer sets a uniform price T for an investment. Since the cost of production
of the investment is normalized to zero, we can interpret the price T as a spread. The
investors observe the report and decide how much of the investment to purchase.
There are two types of investors, sophisticated and naive. A fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of investors
are sophisticated. These investors observe the payo⁄s of the game for both the CRA and the
issuer, and therefore understand the CRA￿ s potential con￿ ict of interest. They do not know,
however, whether the investment is good or bad or observe the signal of the CRA. Naive
investors simply don￿ t understand the incentives of the CRA and take its ratings at face
value. The coexistence of naive and sophisticated investors may be thought of as the result
of di⁄erent types of incentives to perform due diligence. Naive investors may be managing
third party investment and their revenue only depends marginally upon the ex-post return of
the assets they manage21; sophisticated investors￿incentive packages may be, instead, more
related to the ex-post behavior of the investments they select.
If investors ￿nd out that the CRA lied, they will punish the CRA in future periods by
ignoring its reports. Investors, however, cannot determine at the time the rating is issued
whether it is truthful or not. More formally, they cannot determine whether the rating
m 2 fB;Gg is equal to the signal received by the CRA ￿ 2 fb;gg. But they are able to
20We don￿ t allow for unsolicited ratings. We do, however, analyze the process of altering a structured
￿nancial product in section 6.
21Regulation that forces managers to only purchase investments with good ratings could also provide these
incentives.
8￿nd out ex-post whether the CRA lied in the event of a default. In practice it is di¢ cult
to determine whether a CRA misled investors even ex-post. Still, it is generally easier to
make that determination ex-post rather than ex-ante. To simplify the analysis we make the
somewhat extreme assumption that investors can perfectly identify whether the CRA lied
in the event of a default.22
Hence, if the CRA receives a signal ￿ = g and reports m = G, then should the investment
fail the CRA will not be punished, as investors can see that it acted in good faith. However,
a CRA who receives a signal ￿ = b and reports m = G will be punished if the project fails.
Reputation costs create the incentive to tell the truth, since investors can eventually learn
and punish the CRA.23 We de￿ne the discounted sum of future pro￿ts as ￿, which in essence
is the gain from not lying. Reputation costs are exogenous in the model, as in Morgan and
Stocken (2003), Ottaviani and Sorensen (2008), and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007).
This allows us to focus on policy implications in a tractable manner.
We assume that the reputation at stake is slightly noisy:
Assumption A0: There is a tiny amount of uncertainty on the part of the CRA about
the actual value of ￿, i.e. ￿ 2 [~ ￿ ￿ ";~ ￿ + "] such that " ! 0. This uncertainty is resolved
when the CRA receives its signal.
This assumption restricts the CRA￿ s strategy space since for any small amount of uncer-
tainty, however small, it will be unable to set fees exactly at levels to make itself indi⁄erent
between reports. Thus, this small uncertainty limits the CRA to pure strategies.
Both types of investors are risk neutral. They can either purchase 1 unit or 2 units of
the investment. We assume that they have a reservation utility that is increasing in the size
of their investment, speci￿cally they need a return of u on the ￿rst unit of their investment
and a return of U on the second unit, where U > u.24 One may think of this in several ways:
it could be an investor holding her money in cash and needing a larger return to invest all
of it, a need for a higher return in order to commit to only one investment vehicle and not
diversify, or a form of risk aversion.
22Formally we can motivate this assumption by assuming that the recovery value in default is a random
variable and even though the expected value is always r, the realizations di⁄er depending on the signal ￿
observed by the CRA ex-ante. The economic idea here is that the issuer also gets a noisy signal ￿ ex-ante
and takes greater precautions to salvage some recovery value when ￿ = b than when ￿ = g.
23Interestingly enough, CRAs are "immune from misstatements under Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933" and have won most cases against them based on the arguments that credit ratings are free speech and
are "extensively disclaimed" (Partnoy (2002)). Hence, the punishment we refer to is investors withdrawing
their business.
24The speci￿c form the reservation utility takes could be modeled in multiple ways and give the same
results, this form is chosen for simplicity.
9We de￿ne the probability of default cuto⁄p￿ such that an investor is indi⁄erent between
purchasing two units or just one unit of the investment:
(1 ￿ p
￿)R + p
￿r = U: (1)
We also make the following assumptions on the returns on investment:
(1 ￿ p)R + pr > u (A1)






Assumption A1 says that an investor who knows the investment is bad would be willing
to purchase 1 unit. Assumption A2 says that an investor with reliable information that the
investment is good purchases 2 units. The information problem is explicit in assumption A3:
not knowing whether an investment is good or bad (and evaluating the investment with the
ex-ante beliefs), an investor would only purchase 1 unit. This implies that if the CRA did
not exist, the issuer would not be able to sell 2 units to any investor since the probability
that the issue is bad is too large. The CRA can therefore potentially increase welfare by
providing information.
Timing of moves
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The CRA posts its initial fee ￿
I and ratings fee ￿
R.
2. The issuer asks for the signal to be retrieved or not.
3. Given a request by the issuer, the CRA receives the signal and then makes a report of
m = G or m = B.
4. The issuer observes the report and decides whether to buy and distribute it or not.
The issuer then sets a price T for a unit of the investment.
5. Investors observe the price T and the CRA rating if there is any and decide how much
of the investment to purchase.
106. The return is realized.
To simplify notation, we make the following de￿nitions:
V
G = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ e)p)R + (1 ￿ e)pr
V
B = (1 ￿ ep)R + epr
V







The ￿rst expression V G represents the maximum value either type of investor can have
for an investment given precision e. The second expression V B is the minimum value, and















2.1 The Ratings Game with a single CRA
The CRA receives a signal and must decide what to report. The issuer must decide whether to
purchase the report, and subsequently how much to charge investors. Sophisticated investors
must infer how good the investment is and formulate their willingness to pay.
There are situations where the action ￿ Don￿ t buy￿is o⁄ the equilibrium path. As we
employ the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, there is no restriction on o⁄-the-
equilibrium-path beliefs. However, we shall restrict attention to equilibria where o⁄ the
equilibrium path beliefs are equal to ex-ante beliefs (that is, the investment is expected to
be good with probability 1
2). This is not really restrictive, since the issuer can refuse to deal
with the CRA before the CRA receives a signal, in which case the issuer would always have
the option of dealing directly with investors with ex-ante beliefs.25
For the analysis, we focus on the situation where the issuer purchases at least one type
of report, which will be con￿rmed as equilibrium behavior. We solve the game backwards,
beginning with the decision of what report to issue after observing the signal.
25Hence, we implicitly consider the case where beliefs o⁄ the equilibrium path are also worse than the
ex-ante beliefs.
11Lemma 1 Given the fee ￿
R, the CRA￿ s reporting strategy is:
1. For ￿
R > ep￿, the CRA always reports ￿G￿
2. For 0 < ￿
R < ep￿, the CRA reports the truth, relaying its signal perfectly.
Proof. Given that the issuer may not purchase after a given report, we will label the fee
￿
R as two di⁄erent fees, the fee collected after a ￿G￿report, ￿
R
G (which could be ￿
R or zero)
and the fee collected after a ￿B￿report, ￿
R
B (which could be ￿
R or zero).
Conditional on receiving a good signal, the CRA may report ￿G￿ , in which case it earns
￿(G j g) = ￿
R
G + ￿:
It receives a fee ￿
R
G for its report m = G and subsequently earns its full future rent. If the
CRA were to report m = B conditional on receiving a good signal, it would earn
￿(B j g) = ￿
R
B + ￿;
as there is no punishment for having said the investment was bad. Similarly, conditional on
receiving a bad signal, the payo⁄ of rating m = B is
￿(B j b) = ￿
R
B + ￿:
Reporting m = G conditional on a bad signal ￿ = b, however, yields:
￿(G j b) = ￿
R
G + (1 ￿ ep)￿;
since now with probability ep the investment defaults and the CRA is punished, while with
the complementary probability there is no default and the CRA earns ￿.
Conditional on receiving the good signal, the incentive to report m = G depends on the
di⁄erence in payo⁄s:





Conditional on receiving the bad signal, the report to say m = B is:









B > ep￿, the CRA always reports








B < 0, the CRA always
reports B.
12There is no informational regime where a report of B increases the valuations of sophis-
ticated investors above their ex-ante valuation of V 0. Moreover, by assumption, a report of
B decreases the valuations of naive investors below V 0. Therefore, there is no reason for an
issuer to purchase a B report, making the CRA￿ s return on a B report equal to ￿
R
B = 0. The
lemma follows from the non-negativity of fees.
There are thus two possible reporting regimes, one where the CRA in￿ ates the invest-
ment quality and one where the CRA truthfully reveals the investment quality. The lemma
establishes that a B report will never be purchased. Therefore the issuer provides incentives
by using only the reporting fee and its right to shop.
We proceed by analyzing the fees the CRA would set in each informational regime.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the fee setting game is:
1. If ￿2V G ￿V 0 > ep￿, the CRA always reports m = G, sets ￿
R 2 (ep￿;￿2V G ￿V 0] and
￿
I = ￿2V G ￿ V 0 ￿ ￿
R, and has pro￿ts
￿2V
G ￿ V




2. If ￿2V G￿V 0 < ep￿, the CRA reports truthfully, sets ￿
R 2 [0;min[2V G+max[￿V 0;V B]￿
2V 0;ep￿]], ￿
I = 1
2(min[2V G + max[￿V 0;V B] ￿ 2V 0;ep￿] ￿ ￿








Proof. If the CRA always reports m = G, the issuer is willing to purchase this rating




the incremental pro￿t obtained from naive investors. There are many beliefs o⁄ the equi-
librium path for sophisticated investors such that no deviation will occur. Always reporting




(from Lemma 1) and CRA pro￿ts are then
￿2V
G ￿ V




If the CRA reveals its signal truthfully, the m = G report induces the highest valuations from
both naive and sophisticated investors buying two units, while the m = B report induces
13the lowest valuations for sophisticated investors and the ex-ante valuation for naive investors







I = 0, ￿









It is clear that ￿
R = 2V G ￿ max[￿V 0;V B] violates this. The maximum fee is then given







Reporting truthfully and setting ￿
R = 2V G+max[￿V 0;V B]￿2V 0 is not feasible whenever
always reporting m = G is feasible since
￿2V
G ￿ V



















Lastly, if both always reporting m = G and truthtelling are feasible (￿2V G ￿V 0 > ep￿),
the CRA prefers to always report m = G since:
￿2V
G ￿ V
0 + (1 ￿
ep
2

















for all parameters. The proposition establishes that the CRA can maximize its present
discounted value of pro￿ts by choosing either of the two informational regimes depending
on the parameters. Overstating the quality of the investment is an equilibrium outcome,
14despite the presence of reputation costs. This is also a point that Mathis, McAndrews, and
Rochet (2008) make.
The cuto⁄ ￿2V G ￿ V 0 ￿ ep￿ determines whether the CRA in￿ ates the quality of the
investment. For low reputation costs and a large naive audience, the CRA takes advantage
of the naive investors by always reporting m = G. For high reputation costs and a large
sophisticated audience, the CRA is willing to tell the truth and create information for all
investors. This suggests that ratings in￿ ation will be greater in times when there is more
naivete among investors. This may occur in boom times, when investors have less incentive
to hunt for bargains or perform due diligence. An increase in the precision of the signal has
competing e⁄ects. It raises the expected valuation of naive investors, giving higher short
term returns to the CRA. On the other hand, it also makes the probability that the CRA
gets caught for misleading investors larger, decreasing future returns.
The payo⁄ to truthtelling is bounded above by the expected reputation cost ep￿. This
constraint on information revelation is also present in Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007).
3 Competition among Ratings Agencies
We now examine the game where two ratings agencies compete in selling ratings to issuers.
The CRAs can be thought of as having di⁄erentiated products since they are receiving
imperfect (e < 1) signals about the quality of the investment. In addition, more than one
CRA￿ s rating may be purchased to provide maximum information.
The timing of the game with competition is similar to the game with one CRA:




k , where k = 1;2 represents the ￿rm.
2. The issuer asks each CRA for their signal to be retrieved or not.
3. The CRAs receive their signals and produce reports of m = G or m = B,
4. The issuer observes the reports and decides whether to purchase and distribute one,
both, or neither report. It then sets a price T per unit of the investment,
5. Investors observe the report(s) purchased by the issuer and decide how much of the
investment to purchase,
6. The return is realized.
15Again to simplify notation, we adopt the following de￿nitions:
V
GG = (1 ￿
(1 ￿ e)2
(1 ￿ e)2 + e2p)R +
(1 ￿ e)2
(1 ￿ e)2 + e2pr
V
BB = (1 ￿
e2
(1 ￿ e)2 + e2p)R +
e2




















The terms V GG and V BB represent the value to sophisticated investors when both CRAs
report respectively m = G and m = B truthfully. They also represent the value to naive
investors when both CRAs report m = G and m = B whether truthfully or not. The value
to naive investors when one CRA reports m = G and the other reports m = B is V 0, the








The term ￿two(￿) de￿nes the ex-ante (expected) revenues that the issuer has from con-
tracting two truthful CRAs. Similarly, the term ￿one(￿) de￿nes the ex-ante (expected) rev-
enues that the issuer has from contracting one truthful CRA. Note that these are revenues,
i.e. the fees are not included.






The inequality says that the value of the ￿rst G report for naive investors is larger than
the value of a second G report for all investors. We also make the following assumption to
guarantee existence of the truthtelling equilibrium:
26Without A4, there can still be equilibria where both CRAs tell the truth and equilibria where both
CRAs always report G (and there would be no equilibria where one CRA tells the truth and one always
reports G). However, there would be multiple equilibria for each informational regime, there would need
to be another restriction on parameters to guarantee existence, and both types of equilibria could co-exist.
Assumption A4 also places a lower bound on ￿, which means some shopping will always occur. This plays







This condition prevents a CRA from unilaterally deviating to sell only to naive customers.






This is not critical to the results, but aids in presentation. It does two things. First,
it will be used to de￿ne a range of ￿ such that approaching 2 truthtelling CRAs has less
value than approaching 1 truthtelling CRA.27 Second, it implies that V 0
2V G < V BB
V 0 , which ￿xes
cuto⁄s for which shopping will occur. For example, when there are two B reports the issuer
must decide between charging V 0 to naive investors or V BB to everyone. There is then a
cuto⁄ V BB
V 0 for ￿ such that it is best to target naive investors for ￿ higher than this cuto⁄
(when there are two B reports), i.e. max[￿V 0;V BB] = ￿V 0. This will be relevant in the
proposition below and in the welfare section.
The discounted sum of future pro￿ts for each CRA if it is not caught lying is ￿D. This
is an exogenous amount as in the case of monopoly. It is a strong assumption, since with
two CRAs there are many possible ways to model reputation. First, it might be that should
one CRA be caught lying, the other CRA gets larger continuation pro￿ts than if neither
were caught lying. Second, it might be that a CRA only gets caught if it is lying and the
other CRA is telling the truth (i.e. the CRA￿ s falsi￿cation stands out and is not attributable
to industrywide factors).28 Third, it might be that both CRAs (the whole industry) gets
punished when any CRA is caught. Our assumption is the simplest, though we remain
interested in exploring the other options.
As before, we solve the game backwards, beginning with the decision of what report to
issue after observing the signal.
Lemma 2 For a given set of fees for both CRAs, CRA k￿ s reporting strategy is:
1. If ￿
R
k > ep￿D, the CRA always reports G.
2. If ￿
R
k < ep￿D, the CRA reports the truth, relaying its signal perfectly.
27This range also exists if the opposite is true, but we would need an alternative condition to denote the
cuto⁄.
28Stolper (2009) examines this type of reputation in a game where a regulator is actively monitoring and
punishing CRAs.
17The proof is the same as that of Lemma 1. We now solve for the Nash Equilibrium of
the fee setting game.
Proposition 2 The Nash equilibrium of the fee setting subgame (assuming A4-A6 hold) is:
1. If ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) > ep￿D, both CRAs always report G, ￿
R
k 2 (ep￿D;￿2(V GG ￿ V G)],
and ￿
I
k = ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) ￿ ￿
R
k for k = 1;2 with CRA pro￿ts given by
￿2(V
GG ￿ V





2. If ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) < ep￿D, both CRAs report truthfully, ￿
R
k ￿ ep￿D, and









k = ￿two(￿) ￿ ￿one(￿),
k = 1;2
















k ￿ ￿two(￿)￿￿one(￿), k = 1;2
are an equilibrium.








k = 0, k = 1;2
The proof is in the appendix.
There are thus two possible equilibria: one where both CRAs always in￿ ate the quality
of the investment, and one where both CRAs reveal truthfully their information about the
investment. The cuto⁄ determining which equilibrium prevails is whether ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) ￿
ep￿D is larger than zero or not.
In the truthtelling equilibrium, when there are few naive investors so that ￿ is small,
a duopoly is not sustainable. The reason is that the information rent for the issuer of an
additional rating is small, given that it won￿ t be able to take advantage of a large number of
naive investors. When the issuer hires only one CRA, then the CRAs compete a la Bertrand
and set fees ￿k = ￿￿k = 0.
With a larger fraction of sophisticated investors and a larger reputation cost there will be
more truthtelling. An increase in the precision of the signal, however, creates a tradeo⁄. The
probability of getting caught is rising in the precision, making truthtelling more likely. But,
the current payo⁄ from manipulating (￿2(V GG ￿ V G)) is increasing for low precision levels,
meaning that truthtelling is less likely. However, in contrast to the case of monopoly, for
18high precision levels the current payo⁄ is decreasing in the precision, meaning that current
and future incentives are aligned in making truthtelling more likely.
Notice that although both CRAs are making positive expected pro￿ts, it is possible for
the investors to observe two reports, one report, or zero reports. One report or zero reports
imply that we are in the situation where the CRAs are telling the truth. The converse, of
course, is that more (two) reports implies a greater likelihood that the CRAs are in￿ ating
the quality of the investment.
Comparing Monopoly and Duopoly in terms of Information Revelation
Comparing the outcome under competition to the case of a monopoly CRA￿ where the
cuto⁄ for truthtelling is whether ￿2V G ￿ V 0 ￿ ep￿ is larger than zero or not￿ we ￿nd again
a tradeo⁄. First, we see that by assumption A4, the payo⁄ to in￿ ating ratings is larger in a
monopoly. In other words, competition reduces the rents from always reporting G. Still, it
is likely that ￿ > ￿D, since the expected loss of business should be larger in monopoly. This
may mitigate the increase in fees available to the monopolist.
Understanding the di⁄erence between plain vanilla corporate bond ratings and structured
￿nance products is important for understanding the subprime crisis. One possible explana-
tion could be that the complexity of assets increased, decreasing the precision of the CRAs￿
analysis. We ￿nd that shopping increases in duopoly when precision decreases if we de￿ne
shopping as taking place when there are less than two G signals (Pr(Shopping) = 1- Pr(of two
G signals)).2930 However, at the same time, we have shown that a decrease in precision low-
ers the bene￿t of in￿ ating and its costs, making it unclear whether truthtelling will decrease
in either market structure. Furthermore, a decrease in precision also makes the bene￿ts of
in￿ ating in monopoly decrease faster than the bene￿ts of in￿ ating in duopoly. This makes
it unclear whether a decrease in precision diminishes truthtelling more in monopoly or in
duopoly.
A stronger explanation in our model lies in increasing the size of the naive population,
which unambiguously gives larger incentives to in￿ ate the quality of the investment. At the
same time, an increase in naivete makes in￿ ating more likely in monopoly than duopoly,
29Skreta and Veldkamp (2008) also point out that less precise signals imply more ratings shopping by
issuers.
30As Calomiris (2008) has argued: ￿Subprime was a relatively new product, [:::] Given the recent origins
of the subprime maket which postdates tle last housing cycle downturn in the U.S. (1989-1991), how were
the rating agencies able to ascertain what the LGD would be on a subrpimer mortgage pool?￿Thus the
lower precision of CRA￿ s information about subprime credit risk may have been a source of ratings in￿ ation
through greater shopping pressure by issuers. Charles Calomiris, (2008), The subprime turmoil: What￿ s old,
what￿ s new, and what￿ s next. Vox: http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1561
19so market power could have played a role. Moreover, if naive investors overestimated the
precision of the CRAs￿reports, the incentive to in￿ ate would be very strong irrespective
of market structure (current payo⁄s increase, future costs don￿ t change). Ashcraft and
Schuermann (2008) support the idea of overestimation, ￿Credit ratings were assigned to
subprime MBS with signi￿cant error. Even though the rating agencies publicly disclosed
their rating criteria for subprime, investors lacked the ability to evaluate the e¢ cacy of these
models.￿
4 Welfare
We now turn to the evaluation of the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcomes. Note that in
our model it is not completely obvious what the relevant e¢ ciency benchmark is, as we have
a fraction of investors who are naive. We consider two welfare criteria: total ex-ante surplus
and investor surplus, and we evaluate expected surplus for all agents from the point of view
of a sophisticated agent, thus adopting a paternalistic point of view. In other words we take
the view that one role of ￿nancial regulation is to protect small and naive investors from
themselves. The main motivation for this view is that naive investors would support such
regulations with the bene￿t of hindsight once their naivete is exposed.
4.1 Total Ex-ante Surplus
We begin by establishing two benchmarks for total surplus, the ￿rst best and the market
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The top expression is given by the probability that the investment is good multiplied by
the surplus created when investors purchase two units plus the probability the investment is
bad multiplied by the surplus when only one unit is purchased.
The market solution when there are no CRAs is just given by V 0￿u since both naive and
sophisticated investors would then only purchase one unit. Therefore the maximum surplus
20that can be gained through the provision of credit ratings is given by 1
2(R ￿ U), the extra
unit purchased when the investment is good.
We now analyze the total surplus created in each equilibrium. In the total surplus
calculations, we add the surplus of investors, credit rating agencies and issuers. The fees
of credit rating agencies and the prices charged by issuers net out. Note that since our
reputation parameters ￿ and ￿D are exogenous and only represent returns to the CRA
from continued interaction, and not investors or issuers, we exclude future surplus from
our calculations and thus look only at welfare in the short run. We also point out that
assumption A4 implies that ￿2V G ￿ V 0 > 0, or ￿ > V 0
2V G. We will therefore examine total
surplus (and investor surplus) for the interval ￿ 2 [ V 0
2V G;1].
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￿(2((1 ￿ p)R + pr) ￿ u ￿ U)
(where the subscript M refers to the monopoly and superscript G refers to the fact
that the CRA always reports G).
Only naive investors purchase at the high prices as the rating reveals no positive
information to sophisticated investors. Since naive investors believe the investment
is good, they invest 2 units. We can rewrite this expression as:
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r) ￿ u ￿ U] = ￿[(V
0 ￿ u) + (V
0 ￿ U)]: (2)
This expression is positive, although it may be quite small. Clearly, the fewer naive
investors there are, the less surplus there is, although there is a lower bound on the size
of the naive investor group given by the condition that this is indeed an equilibrium.
Also, the ￿rst term in the expression in square brackets is our market solution when
there are no CRAs and is positive, while the second term is negative by A3. Hence,
as intuition suggests, the presence of a credit rating agency actually reduces surplus in
this scenario.
2. Monopoly CRA, ￿2V G ￿ V 0 < ep￿ (The CRA reports its signal truthfully):
21There are two subcases here, depending on how the issuer prices the investment when
there is no report (interpreted correctly by sophisticated B investors as a B report
that was not purchased). We ￿rst assume that ￿V 0 < V B, which implies that both
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Thus, the surplus here depends on the precision of the signal. Still, as expected, the
surplus is higher than when there is no CRA as V G > U by assumption A2. As the
precision approaches e = 1, the surplus approaches the ￿rst best.
When ￿V 0 > V B, there is an additional distortion, because the issuer sets its price
high when there is no report to capture naive investors, but excludes sophisticated












B ￿ u] (4)
3. Duopoly, ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) > ep￿D (Both CRAs always report G):
The total surplus here is exactly the same as when there is a monopoly CRA who
always reports G.
Naive investors purchase 2 units and sophisticated investors purchase nothing. The
split of rents between CRAs and the issuer, however, is di⁄erent here, as the issuer
can earn more than V 0 per investor due to competition. If there is a ￿xed operating
cost for CRAs, this would be less e¢ cient than the case of a monopoly CRA. Both an
in￿ ating monopoly and an in￿ ating duopoly are less e¢ cient than a market without
CRAs.
4. Duopoly, ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) < ep￿D (Both CRAs report their signals truthfully):




2V G), only one of the CRAs is hired, and the total surplus is the same as
in the truthtelling monopoly case where ￿V 0 < V B.
When ￿ 2 [
3
2V 0
2V G; V BB
V 0 ], both CRAs are hired and both types of investor purchase one
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In contrast, when the fraction of naive investors is large, so that ￿ 2 [V BB
V 0 ;1], both CRAs
are hired and only naive investors purchase when there are no G reports. The naive investors
are also the only ones to purchase after one G report. Thus the total surplus is the same as
in equation (5), minus the surplus lost from the fact that sophisticated investors no longer
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Comparing the expressions for total surplus, we ￿nd a surprising result: truthtelling in
duopoly yields a lower surplus than truthtelling in monopoly. We prove this in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 Given Assumptions A0-A6, a truthtelling duopoly (where both CRAs are
hired) is less e¢ cient than a truthtelling monopoly.
The proof is in the appendix.
A duopoly is less e¢ cient because there are more opportunities for the issuer to take
advantage of naive investors. This can occur when one CRA reports G and one reports B,
or when both report B. In contrast, in monopoly there is only the opportunity to shop when
the monopoly CRA reports B. As a result, issuers set high prices that exclude sophisticated
23investors from the market when, from an e¢ ciency perspective, they should be participating.
Also, the additional information of the second report is washed away. This is predicated on
the fact that assumption A4 places a lower bound on the number of naive investors, since
clearly shopping doesn￿ t occur when all investors are sophisticated.
When this result is coupled with the fact that a duopoly is equally as e¢ cient as a
monopoly when both are in￿ ating the quality of the investment (and less e¢ cient if we
consider operating costs), this suggests that competition may be detrimental with informa-
tion intermediaries when shopping is allowed. More formally, conditional on being in the
same informational regime, monopoly increases total surplus. Therefore, policy proposal
encouraging entry may not be the best methods to increase welfare. This is in line with the
evidence presented in Becker and Milbourn (2008), who document less accurate ratings in
the corporate bond market due to more competition from Fitch. We discuss other policy
proposals in section 5.
The caveat with regards to the welfare loss from an additional ￿rm, of course, is that this
depends on being in the same informational regime. In section 3, we discussed whether more
truthtelling would occur in monopoly or duopoly. The following result, while not surprising,
makes this caveat important:
Lemma 3 Total surplus when there are two CRAs who report truthfully is larger than when
there are one or two CRAs who always reports G:
The proof is in the appendix.
Not surprisingly, surplus is higher when there is truthtelling in duopoly than a monopoly
or duopoly where G is always reported. Furthermore, in combination with the previous
proposition, this implies that a truthtelling monopoly is more e¢ cient than a monopoly who
always reports G.
This lemma also demonstrates that when comparing monopoly and duopoly it is impor-
tant to know which informational regime the parameters place us in.
4.2 Investor Surplus
Investor surplus is the valuation of investors in excess of the price paid. The maximum
amount of investor surplus available is: V 0 + 1
2R. In the absence of CRAs, investor surplus
is equal to zero since all investors value the investment at V 0 and the issuer sets a price of
V 0. Equilibrium values of investor surplus in each of our four cases are respectively:
241. Monopoly CRA, ￿2V G ￿ V 0 > ep￿ (The CRA always reports G):




From sophisticated investors￿perspective, naive investors are getting duped and pay
more than the true value of the investment. Therefore naive investors get a negative
surplus in this case.
2. Monopoly CRA, ￿2V G ￿ V 0 < ep￿ (The CRA reports its signal truthfully):
As before there are two subcases here. When the fraction of naive investors is small,
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Here, the investors have their full surplus extracted, but are clearly doing better than
when the monopoly CRA always reports G.
When the fraction of naive investors is large, so that ￿V 0 > V B, total surplus is again
negative and equal to ￿
2(V B ￿V 0). Here, the issuer takes advantage of naive investors
and doesn￿ t sell to sophisticated investors when there is a B report. Nevertheless, this
investor surplus is greater than when the CRA always reports G.





Here, naive investors are getting fooled once again, and paying more than in the case
of a monopoly.
4. Duopoly, ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) < ep￿D (Both CRAs report their signals truthfully):




2V G), only one of the CRAs is hired, and investor surplus is zero, the same
as in the truthtelling monopoly case where ￿V 0 < V B.
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This surplus is negative, as naive investors who observe one G report are being taken
advantage of by the issuer.
When the fraction of naive investors is large, so that ￿ 2 [V BB
V 0 ;1], only naive investors
buy the assets when there are no G reports. Therefore, investor surplus is the same as











We show in the next proposition that a duopoly with truthful reporting provides a lower
investor surplus than a monopoly with truthful reporting.
Proposition 4 Given A0-A6, Investor surplus for a truthtelling duopoly (when both CRAs
are hired) is strictly smaller than that of a truthtelling monopoly.
The proof is in the appendix.
Given that capital markets are competitive, issuers extract most of the surplus of investors
that is created by the CRAs. This surplus may be real or perceived. When only real surplus
is taken away, there is no di⁄erence between a monopoly and a duopoly. However, there is
more scope for perceived added surplus by the naive investors in the case of a duopoly, since
the states of the world where G and B are reported and where B and B are reported present
opportunities to the issuer to dissemble to naive investors through its shopping behavior.
As a result of this issuer shopping behavior, a truthful CRA duopoly is worse for investors
than a truthful CRA monopoly. Therefore, conditional on being in the truthful information
regime, more ￿rms can make investors worse o⁄.
We now demonstrate that investors are better o⁄ when CRA(s) reveal their information
truthfully.
26Proposition 5 Investor surplus for a truthtelling duopoly is larger than that of monopoly
or duopoly who always reports G.
The proof is in the appendix.
This result is not all that surprising, since naive investors are not duped as often or
by as much when CRA(s) are telling the truth. Furthermore, it is obvious from the text
that investor surplus is larger for a truthtelling monopoly than a monopoly who always
reports G. This once again adds a caveat to the comparison between monopoly and duopoly.
Conditional on being in the same information regime, duopoly is worse here. However, a
truthful duopoly is more desirable than a monopoly that always reports G.
5 Regulating the Credit Ratings Industry
The subprime crisis has brought to light the poor performance of CRAs in rating structured
￿nancial products and reminded investors of CRAs￿past poor performance in predicting the
East Asian crisis, the excesses of the dotcom bubble, and the collapse of Enron. There have
thus been renewed calls in recent months to regulate CRAs.
New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo already reached an agreement with
credit ratings ￿rms to change some features of the rating process. Also, the SEC was given
authority by the United States Congress in 2007 to regulate the credit ratings industry and
has begun to propose rules in the summer of 2008. The European Union is also pursuing
regulations to resolve con￿ icts of interest in the credit ratings industry.
In this section we discuss the most prominent proposals in the context of our model. In
our view, the key issues which the proposals seek to address are:
1. eliminating the CRA con￿ icts by preventing issuers from paying for speci￿c ratings,
2. preventing issuers from shopping for ratings and disclosing only ratings they prefer,
and
3. monitoring the quality of the ratings methodology.
5.1 The Cuomo Plan
The agreement between Andrew Cuomo and Standard & Poor￿ s, Moody￿ s, and Fitch essen-
tially addresses the ￿rst point, preventing issuers from paying for speci￿c ratings and forcing
27issuers to pay the CRA upfront before it does its initial analysis.31 This restriction can elim-
inate CRA con￿ icts-of-interest and their incentives to in￿ ate the quality of the investment
in our model, but importantly it does not eliminate shopping by the issuer.
In our model, issuer shopping can create distortions even with unbiased CRA ratings
due to the naivete of some investors. With only an upfront fee for a rating, the issuer no
longer has a means to provide incentives for good ratings.32 As the CRA gets the same fee
irrespective of what it announces, it now has incentives to report B when it receives a b
signal thus avoiding the reputation cost ￿. When the CRA receives a g signal it is indi⁄erent
between reports: we assume that it reports G, which could be justi￿ed by an epsilon cost of
lying.33
The solution to the game is then straightforward. The presence of upfront fees selects the
truthtelling equilibrium as the equilibrium for any parameter values. Indeed, this is the same
truthtelling equilibrium as in Proposition 1 (for monopoly) and Proposition 2 (for duopoly)
where (i) there are no restrictions on parameter values for which this is the solution and (ii)
￿
R = 0. Therefore issuer pro￿ts, CRA pro￿ts, total surplus, and investor surplus are then
exactly the same as in the truthtelling equilibrium.
While the Cuomo agreement ensures that CRA truthtelling is the unique equilibrium
outcome, shopping still occurs. This ensures that a duopoly can exist even though it is
ine¢ cient from the social welfare point of view.
5.2 Eliminating Shopping from the Cuomo Plan
Given that under the Cuomo agreement naive investors can still be exploited by issuers who
shop for the best ratings, we examine the merits of a stronger regulation of CRAs: forcing
credit ratings agencies to disclose ratings on any investment for which they have received an
upfront fee. In terms of the model, this means removing the stage where the issuer decides
whether to publish the rating(s) from the timing of the game under the Cuomo agreement.
Under a monopoly CRA, given that both good and bad ratings get disclosed, the issuer
is now forced to set T = V B when a B rating is reported. Issuer pro￿ts are therefore equal
31There is a ￿ne point here which is that the deal speci￿es upfront payments for initial analysis but does
not prevent subsequent payments. This is obviously an issue, but outside the scope of our model.
32It is of course possible through repeated interactions between an issuer and a CRA to dynamically create
these incentives. This is out of the scope of our analysis, but certainly a caveat.
33Note, however, that in situations when it is di¢ cult to verify whether a CRA lied even ex-post, this





















The CRA￿ s pro￿t, total surplus, and investor surplus are then exactly the same as in our
model in section 2 and under the Cuomo agreement if ￿V 0 < V B. However, if ￿V 0 > V B,
CRA pro￿ts are lower34 here than in the model in section 2 and under the Cuomo agreement,
while total surplus and investor surplus is larger. Hence, when there are many naive investors
to take advantage of, eliminating shopping has clear welfare gains.
In the case of a CRA duopoly, the issuer now must sets T = V BB if there are two B
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so that the di⁄erence in pro￿ts of hiring two versus one CRA is (after simplifying):
￿e(1 ￿ e)V
0;
which is always negative. Therefore, the issuer purchases only one rating. This induces
Bertrand competition with the CRAs setting their fees ￿k = ￿￿k = 0. Total surplus and
investor surplus must then be the same as when there is a monopoly CRA and ￿ < V B
V 0 .
The unintended consequence of eliminating shopping is to reduce the number of ratings.
This occurs because the rents to an extra rating decrease. By Proposition 3, total surplus
is higher under a truthtelling monopoly CRA without shopping than under a truthtelling
duopoly with shopping for the interval ￿ 2 [ V 0
2V G;1].
In sum, the no-shopping plan is equivalent to the Cuomo plan in terms of total surplus and




2V G), and has higher surplus for ￿ 2 [
3
2V 0
2V G;1). Shopping may
be di¢ cult to eliminate however, because informal discussions between issuers and CRAs may
still take place. Disclosure requirements, such as those advocated by the SEC, may reduce
the latitude to have such discussions. In the section on structured ￿nance products, we point
out that there may also be unintended negative consequences from promoting disclosure.
34It is easy to show that 1
2V G + ￿ ￿ 1
2 min[2V G + max[￿V 0;V B] ￿ 2V 0;ep￿] + ￿ reduces to V B ￿
max[￿V 0;V B].
295.3 An Investors-Pay Solution
The credit rating industry in the U.S. underwent a transformation in the early 1970s from
investors paying for ratings to issuers paying for them. The main reason for the shift was
the reduction in pro￿ts for credit rating ￿rms due to free riding by investors (White, 2002
observes that this shift coincides with the spread of the photocopier).
As the issuer-pays model has inherent con￿ icts-of-interests, a natural policy proposal is to
return to an investors-pay model. To get around the free-riding problem, a transactions tax
on investors could be used to pay for the ratings of bonds and structured ￿nance products.
Besides enforcing such a tax, the government also faces the following problems: computing
the optimal tax so as to reward CRAs su¢ ciently, monitoring CRA performance and provid-
ing credible punishments so that there are indeed reputation e⁄ects for in￿ ating the quality
of an issue, and choosing how many CRAs should be active.
In our model, an investors-pay model supplemented with a transactions tax would achieve
the same outcome as the Cuomo plan without shopping, if it guarantees upfront payments
to CRA(s) and imposes the full disclosure of ratings. If the government were then able
to determine the likely fraction of naive investors, it could implement the e¢ cient market
structure (either using a total surplus or investor surplus criteria).
5.4 Moral Hazard Issues
The Cuomo plan with or without shopping, and the investors-pay plan can strictly increase
total surplus when there is a monopoly. Still, there is a risk of a welfare loss from this plan
due to moral hazard. Suppose the precision of the signal e were a choice variable of the CRA
and larger precision is more costly. If the CRA can choose this precision after being paid
upfront35 and it is non-contractible then the CRAs would choose the minimum precision of
1
2 and knowing this, the issuer would not hire the CRA in the ￿rst place. Therefore there
would be breakdown in the market for certi￿cation.
This breakdown can occur under all the regulations we have discussed so far if they
involve only ￿xed upfront payments for the ratings. In our main model with no regulation,
adding the observable choice of precision in monopoly will lead to positive investment by
the CRA since the issuer pays contingent fees. Still, our total surplus calculations show that
35If precision were not e⁄ort in performing the analysis on the investment, but quality of the analytic
models used, then the CRAs would choose larger precision, since it would in essence be chosen before the
fees were paid.
30breakdown of the CRA market could still be more e¢ cient (in terms of total ex-ante surplus)
than a CRA who in￿ ates quality, but less e¢ cient than a CRA who tells the truth.
If the plans were accompanied by oversight of minimum analytical standards for the
CRAs (and these standards were set appropriately and could be enforced), they could retain
the bene￿cial aspects we have highlighted above.
6 Rating Structured Finance Products
Our analysis so far has considerably simpli￿ed the back and forth negotiations between
issuers and CRAs and has only allowed for a limited form of issuer shopping. For structured
￿nance products, however, issuers can make changes in the characteristics of the asset pool
and the tranching of the issue to obtain a higher rating for the senior tranches (see Gorton,
2008, Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery, 2009, and Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2008).
In this section we extend the model to analyze the e⁄ect of such negotiations between issuers
and CRAs. Speci￿cally, we extend our model to allow the issuer to change the probability of
default of the investment. To focus on the e⁄ects of this change we restrict attention to the
case of a monopoly CRA. We also assume that all investors are naive and precision is equal
to one, just to make the calculations simple. Nevertheless, setting the precision equal to one
and not permitting the issuer to have any private information makes this a situation where
ratings in￿ ation is less likely to occur than otherwise, so our ￿ndings bear extra weight.
The main changes to our model are as follows. First, we let the ex-ante belief about
the probability of default p be uniformly distributed over the continuous interval [0;1].36
The ex-ante expectation of p is then 1
2. We also modify assumption A3 such that p￿ < 1
2,
where p￿ is as before the cut-o⁄ at which an investor is indi⁄erent between one or two units
of the investment (see equation 1). Second, the CRA now receives a signal about whether
the investment will default with probability lower than p￿ (the good signal g) or probability
higher than p￿ (the bad signal b). The CRA can make a subsequent report of G or B.
Rede￿ning our notation, a good rating now gives expected value
V




a bad rating gives expected value
V




36We need p to be continuous to de￿ne how an investment can be restructured.
31and the ex-ante valuation of the investment is the same as before,
V




Following a bad report, the issuer can then restructure an investment as follows. He can
propose the creation of a senior tranche and a junior tranche, where the probability that the
senior tranche defaults is decreased by an amount ￿. The issuer keeps the junior tranche,
which involves a loss of ￿(R￿r), the expected value of the senior tranche minus the expected
value of the original investment. The probability that the senior tranche will then be rated
as good, or below p￿; is then ￿
1￿p￿.37
This credit enhancement is only relevant if the CRA intends to truthfully rate the issuer.
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We maintain this assumption throughout this section.
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We assume that the issuer only gets one chance to restructure the investment. If the
investment fails to get a G rating the issuer doesn￿ t purchase a rating and sells the original
investment without any tranching.
The solution to the issuer￿ s credit enhancement problem is:
^ ￿ =
2V G ￿ V 0 ￿ ￿
R
2(R ￿ r)
and his expected pro￿ts under optimal enhancement are:
(2V G ￿ V 0 ￿ ￿
R)2
4(R ￿ r)(1 ￿ p￿)
+ V
0 (9)
Clearly, as long as
￿
2V G ￿ V 0 ￿ ￿
R￿
is positive, the issuer has an incentive to restructure
the investment.
In the initial stage where the issuer submits the original investment for a rating, the CRA
earns ￿
R for a G rating and
^ ￿
1￿p￿￿
R for a B rating. Since we have that 2V G￿V 0 <
1+p￿￿￿
2 ￿,
37We assume an interior solution where ￿
1￿p￿ < 1.
32it must be the case a fortiori that 2V G ￿ V 0 <
1+p￿
2 ￿, which implies that the CRA will also
tell the truth in the initial stage.










substituting in for ^ ￿ and solving yields:
￿
R =
2V G ￿ V 0 + 2p￿(R ￿ r)
2
:
This means that the equilibrium probability reduction of default is:
^ ￿ =
2V G ￿ V 0 ￿ 2p￿(R ￿ r)
4(R ￿ r)
:




￿(R ￿ r) (A7)
This assumption implies that ^ ￿ > 0 and also that ￿
R < 2V G ￿ V 0, which guarantees
that the CRA indeed prefers truthtelling. Lastly, the CRA sets ￿
I such that the issuer￿ s
ex-ante surplus is equal to the outside option V 0.
In sum, the solution to our credit ratings game is such that: 1) the issuer applies for a
￿rst proposed rating; 2) if the rating is good the issuer purchases the rating at price ￿
R; 3)
if the rating is bad, the issuer restructures the issue by creating two tranches at a cost of
^ ￿(R￿r), which lowers the probability of default of the issue by ^ ￿; 4) the CRA responds by
changing its rating from bad to good with probability
^ ￿
1￿p￿. Thus, the e⁄ect of restructuring
is to increase both the number of highly rated issues and the average probability of default
of highly rated issues.
Given that credit enhancement helps reduce the probability of default it is not clear a
priori whether this restructuring activity is welfare reducing or whether it reduces investor
surplus. Consider ￿rst how total ex-ante surplus is a⁄ected. Our benchmark is the surplus
in the game without restructuring. From section 2 we know that the equilibrium fee in the
game without restructuring is ￿
R = 2V G ￿ V 0. Since 2V G ￿ V 0 <
1+p￿
2 ￿, the CRA is in the
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In contrast, under restructuring total ex-ante surplus is:
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The ￿rst part is equal to the benchmark total surplus under no restructuring. The last
term is due to the restructuring, and is negative given equation 1. There is no extra value
added from restructuring since the cost of credit enhancement nets out with the decrease in
the probability of default. However, restructuring convinces investors to purchase an extra
unit, which from a welfare point of view is ine¢ cient.
The issuer is clearly bene￿ting in an ex-post sense (after ￿
I is sunk) from the ability to
restructure the investment as its ex-post pro￿ts are strictly greater than what it earns in
the benchmark case, V 0. This can be seen in equation 9. The credit rating agency is also
bene￿ting. This can be seen using a revealed preference argument: the CRA can induce
no restructuring, but chooses not to. The CRA must set a lower fee in order to induce
more restructuring, but makes more pro￿ts since it now gets paid sometimes after an initial
B rating. Therefore the welfare loss is coming directly from the loss in investor surplus.
34Investors are being made to pay excessively (and purchase excessively). The issuer and the
CRA are capitalizing on the investors￿naivete despite the fact that the issuer is telling the
truth. In sum, restructuring and credit enhancement is a wasteful activity that only serves
the purpose of deceiving naive investors.
Lastly, this suggests that some types of transparency and disclosure are ine¢ cient. If
the CRA made the rating process transparent to the issuer, then the issuer would provide
exactly the minimum amount of credit enhancement that permits the signal to be G. As a
consequence, the distribution of p for a portfolio that has reached the G rating becomes p￿,
worsening the distortion.
7 Conclusion
Our paper contains an analysis of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) and their con￿ icts of
interest. The model includes the critical elements of the industry: issuer￿ s payments may
in￿ uence ratings, issuers may shop for ratings, CRA models may vary in precision, barriers
to entry create market power for CRAs, and reputation considerations a⁄ect decisionmaking.
We ￿nd that the presence of more naive investors or lower reputation costs give CRAs
incentives to in￿ ate the quality of investments, while the precision of the CRAs analysis has
dual e⁄ects: more precision raises current payo⁄s but also increases the probability of paying
a reputation cost. Our welfare analysis makes it clear that a monopoly is more e¢ cient than
a duopoly, both in terms of total ex-ante surplus and investor surplus. This is because
a duopoly provides more opportunities for the issuer to shop and mislead naive investors.
Finally, we demonstrate that allowing issuers to restructure their investments can further
harm investors and reduce surplus.
We consider three regulatory interventions. First, the requirement of upfront payments
to CRAs eliminates the con￿ icts of interest for CRAs but still permits shopping by issuers.
Second, the prohibition of shopping by enforcing disclosure of all ratings would bene￿t naive
investors. Third, an investors-pay solution may achieve an equivalent outcome but may be
di¢ cult to implement. Unfortunately, neither of these interventions provides incentives to
CRAs to gather information and perform their job well.
It would be interesting to extend this line of research in a dynamic direction in order to
quantify the potential reputation costs that CRAs may incur. In the pursuit of simplicity,
we have made CRAs ex-ante homogeneous. Considering heterogeneity along the lines of
di⁄erent analytical capabilities (and precision of signals) would add realism and potentially
35other interesting results. Finally, we have only considered two signals, but real CRAs have
a much ￿ner gradation.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 2




2 and both CRAs always report G.



















k ;k = 1;2:
If each CRA sets its fee ￿
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k equal to ￿2(V GG ￿V G), the issuer is willing to buy both reports












This condition is satis￿ed by assumption A4. Any fees ￿
R
k 2 (ep￿D;￿2(V GG ￿ V G)] then
satisfy A4. These ratings fees, along with initial fees ￿
I











Note that there can￿ t be an equilibrium where both CRAs set higher fees of ￿2V G ￿ V 0
such that the issuer would only want to purchase a single G report. Indeed, since the reports
are homogeneous goods, each CRA would pro￿t by deviating and lowering its price as in





k = ￿2V G ￿ V 0 isn￿ t a pro￿table deviation from the equilibrium by assumption A4,
36which guarantees that this deviation total fee is larger than ￿2(V GG￿V G), so that the issuer
simply wouldn￿ t pay the high fee.
Now assume that both CRAs rate the investment truthfully. If the CRAs set their fees








since 2(V GG ￿ V G) is the maximum fee that makes the issuer prefer two reports rather
than one, and since ep￿D is the upper bound of the truthtelling constraint. Assumption A4
implies that the issuer prefers two reports to none. From assumption A4 we also know that
the issuer purchases a G report when the other CRA reports B.
We also need to check the issuer￿ s incentives from an ex-ante perspective, i.e. before
paying the initial fees, does the issuer want to deal with both, either, or neither CRA? We
now use the de￿nitions ￿two(￿) and ￿one(￿) to explore this.
It is easy to show that ￿two(￿) is strictly larger than V 0 given that ￿ satis￿es A4. The




































The left hand side of this condition is equal to:
￿
two(￿) ￿ ￿


















2V G < ￿ < V BB
V 0 and one out of two reports is a G, the issuer sets only purchases
the G report and sets V G as the price, duping naive investors. The di⁄erence in pro￿ts
between two versus one CRA is:
￿
two(￿) ￿ ￿










2V G) and positive for ￿ 2 [
3
2V 0
2V G; V BB
V 0 ) given A6.
37Next, in the interval V BB
V 0 < ￿ < V B
V 0 , the di⁄erence in pro￿ts is now:
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which is also positive given A6.




2V G), the issuer has no incentive to hire 2 CRAs for any
set of fees. It will then hire one CRA. Since the CRAs are ex-ante homogeneous, this will
provoke Bertrand competition and all fees will be set equal to zero.
For ￿ 2 [
3
2V 0
2V G;1], the issuer will hire 2 CRAs. There are two possible solutions in this
range. Each CRA can set its fees equal to the maximum amount to make the issuer indi⁄erent
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Should this condition not hold, the CRAs will set any fees such that equation 10 holds
with equality and equation 11 is not violated.






￿2V G ￿ V 0 and always report G to earn rents when the other CRA truthfully issues a B
report. This deviation is ruled out by assumption A5.
Finally, if ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) > ep￿D then deviating to a fees of ￿2(V GG ￿ V G) and always
reporting G is pro￿table for a CRA. This sets a boundary on the parameters for which
truthtelling can be an equilibrium.
There can￿ t be an equilibrium where CRA k reveals truthfully and CRA ￿k always
reports G. If this was an equilibrium, we would need ￿
R
k < ep￿D and ￿
R
￿k > ep￿D. However,




￿k ￿ " and always report G. For the same
reason, there can￿ t be an equilibrium where the issuer only purchases one report since any
fee that CRA ￿k would set would be undercut by a deviating CRA k.
388.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Total Surplus with a truthtelling duopoly (where both CRAs are hired) depends on how
large the fraction of naive investors is; that is, what interval ￿ is in: [
3
2V 0
2V G; V BB
V 0 ] or [V BB
V 0 ;1].
In the ￿rst interval, total surplus W truth1





D = e(1 ￿ e)(2R ￿ 2U + 2((1 ￿ p)R + pr) ￿ 2u):
And in the second interval, total surplus W truth2
D given by equation 6 has a larger positive
slope than in the ￿rst interval.
Total surplus in the ￿rst interval is larger than in the second for all ￿ except at the top
when ￿ = 1. Total surplus in the two intervals is equal to
V
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at their maximum point of ￿ = 1.
In sum, the composite total surplus curve increases in the ￿rst interval and jumps down
and increases in the second interval.
Total Surplus with a truthtelling monopoly also depends on what interval ￿ is in: [ V 0




Over the ￿rst interval total surplus is independent of ￿ (see equation 3), while over the
second interval it jumps down and is increasing (see equation 4).
We compare ￿rst W truth1
M and W truth1
D .
When ￿ = 0, the di⁄erence in total surpluses is:
W
truth1
M (￿ = 0) ￿ W
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D (￿ = 0)
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= 2e(1 ￿ e)(V
0 ￿ u) + e(1 ￿ e)(V
0 ￿ U)
= e(1 ￿ e)(3V
0 ￿ 2u ￿ U):
This expression is positive since 2V 0 ￿ u ￿ U > 0.
39When ￿ = 1, the di⁄erence in total surpluses is:
W
truth1
M (￿ = 1) ￿ W
truth1









2 ￿ (1 ￿ e)
2)(R ￿ U)











(e ￿ (1 ￿ e))(R ￿ U) + (1 ￿ e)(1 + e)(V
0 ￿ U)]
= ￿e(1 ￿ e)(V
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This expression is again positive as V 0 < U.
As we have already shown,
W
truth1
D (￿ = 1) = W
truth2
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Lastly, we must examine whether W truth2
D and W truth2
M can cross. We know that
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M (￿ = 1)):
Furthermore, we can establish that W truth2
D (￿ = 0) < W truth2
M (￿ = 0):
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= e(1 ￿ e)(2V
0 ￿ u ￿ U) > 0:
40Given that both W truth2
D and W truth2
M increase linearly in ￿, they cannot cross. This
establishes the proof.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The total surplus when two CRAs report truthfully (and both are hired) is smallest when
￿V 0 > V BB. This is given in equation 6. We compare this expression to the total surplus
when one or two CRAs always report G, which are given by equation 2.
First, total surplus when the two CRAs report truthfully and ￿ = 0 can be written as:
W
truth2







2)(U ￿u)] > 0
while total surplus when both CRAs always report G and ￿ = 0 is equal to zero.
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are both positive.
Finally, when ￿ = 1, the di⁄erence between the total surpluses is:
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truth2
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which is larger than zero by A3 and e ￿ 1
2. This completes the proof.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
For the interval ￿ 2 [ V 0
2V G; V B
V 0 ], the proposition is obvious. Therefore, take ￿ 2 [V B
V 0 ;1], so































p(R ￿ r)4e(1 ￿ e)(2e ￿ 1)
which is strictly positive for e > 1
2.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
First, notice that investor surplus for a monopoly who always reports G, is larger than
investor surplus for a duopoly that always reports G. Therefore a comparison with the
former is su¢ cient to establish the result. Second, given that 2e(1￿e) < 1, investor surplus
in a truthtelling duopoly is strictly larger over the interval ￿ 2 [ V 0
2V G; V BB
V 0 ].
Over the interval ￿ 2 [V BB
V 0 ;1] the di⁄erence in investor surplus between the truthtelling
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All but the last term in parentheses are unambiguously positive.
The last term is equal to 0 at e = 1
2. The ￿rst derivative is
4 ￿
2e(1 ￿ e)
((1 ￿ e)2 + e2)2;
which is equal to 2 at e = 1
2, while the second derivative
(4e ￿ 2)[((1 ￿ e)2 + e2)2 + 4((1 ￿ e)2 + e2)e(1 ￿ e)]
((1 ￿ e)2 + e2)
4 ;
is non-negative, so that the ￿rst derivative is increasing.
Therefore the ￿rst derivative is always positive and the last term is positive, which com-
pletes the proof.
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